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While copyright infringement is a legal wrong, plagiarism is a
breach of academic and market practices. However, few authors
of literary works truly understand the difference between the two.
Copyright law seeks to protect economic interests in an underlying
work, while plagiarism—and in countries where moral rights are
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attention on the kinds of claims an author or copyright holder
might make with respect to unauthorized uses of a literary work.
The ease with which a digital work may be cut and pasted, or
generally repurposed, creates a need to reconsider the types of
legal and market wrongs that arise with respect to digitally
distributed literary works. Drawing on observations from the
digital publishing industry, this Article proposes a taxonomy of
borrowing from existing works that serves to clarify the kinds of
borrowing that should be legally and economically tolerated as
contrasted with conduct that may be regarded as wrongful. It is
the hope that this taxonomy assists in the development of both
digital copyright law and market approaches to acceptable versus
unacceptable borrowing in the digital publishing sphere.
“Plagiarism’s bad enough,” Goss said. “But from a
girl? I can’t believe you’d plagiarize from a girl.”1

INTRODUCTION
Today’s Copyright law derives from the needs of the nascent
publishing industry centuries ago in Europe following the advent
of the printing press.2 Moral rights law—in countries where such
laws are robust—derives from the needs of creators of artistic and
literary works to be protected with respect to the authorial integrity
of their works.3 Plagiarism, while not a legal wrong, is a concept
that also protects a creator’s right to be identified as the author of a
work, and to prevent unattributed misappropriation of the work by
others.4 All of these regimes relate to authors’ rights in their
original creations. They all facilitate and protect creators of
original works from unauthorized misappropriation, but they do so
1

TOBIAS WOLFF, OLD SCHOOL, 144 (2003).
See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 3–5 (5th ed. 2010)
(detailing the invention of the printing press and the enactment of the first copyright
statute in the United Kingdom, the Statute of Anne of 1710).
3
See Jacqueline Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 537, 543–45 (2011) (describing the bases of European moral
rights law).
4
See infra Part I.D.
2
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in different ways, and in different contexts. The interplay between
them is often complicated, and is poorly understood by most
creators of artistic and literary works.
The advent of the digital age creates greater pressures than ever
on those involved in the creation and dissemination of literary
works to ensure that they understand the contours of what are
acceptable versus unacceptable uses of existing material. While no
writer is an island and all new works rely to some extent on
borrowing from works that have predated them, there must be
some boundaries provided by the law and market norms with
respect to when borrowing is appropriate and when it should be
characterized as wrongful. These boundaries may be in different
places depending on the field of endeavor. For example,
borrowing from scientific works to further fields of research and
scholarship may be more acceptable than borrowing from purely
fictional works whose main value is entertainment. It is also likely
that the nature and type of borrowing sanctioned in the literary
field generally will differ in many ways from what is permissible
in other fields of creative endeavor such as movies, music, games,
and the like.
This Article attempts to formulate a taxonomy of digital
borrowing in the field of literary works. The idea is to draw from
current conduct in the digital publishing industry in order to
ascertain what might be regarded as acceptable borrowing and how
it might contrast with conduct that is either a legal or a moral
wrong, or both. In particular, it teases out the elements of
copyright and plagiarism that have the most impact on the
determination of wrongfulness in different contexts. While the
Article suggests no major law reforms, it advocates a more
nuanced approach to applying existing regulatory principles.
Part I briefly considers the differences (and similarities)
between copyright infringement, moral rights infringement (in
jurisdictions where available), and plagiarism. Part II articulates
the proposed taxonomy of borrowing that might assist the
development of rules, norms, and market practices that better
address the concerns of those involved in digital publishing
markets. Part III draws from the taxonomy to outline ways in
which laws and market practices could better address the concerns
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of authors and copyright holders. Part IV concludes with
suggestions about useful future directions in the regulation of
digital publishing.
I. LEGAL AND OTHER RULES RELATING TO UNAUTHORIZED
BORROWING
A. Copyright, Moral Rights, and Plagiarism
As noted in the Introduction, there are three main sets of rules
that regulate unauthorized borrowing: copyright, moral rights, and
plagiarism. The former two categories are legal rules while the
latter derives from market norms and institutional honor codes.
While these regimes apply to all kinds of creative works—
including musical works, artistic works, sculptural works, movies,
and games—this Article focuses on their application to literary
works, predominantly commercial and literary fiction. However,
unauthorized borrowing of academic and scientific works is
considered to the extent that imperatives about digital borrowing of
these works differ from those relating to fictional works. It should
also be noted that in the context of this discussion “unauthorized”
borrowing does not necessarily equate to “wrongful” conduct.
“Unauthorized” simply means not authorized by the creator of the
work or the copyright holder, or both. “Wrongful” suggests a legal
or moral wrong. “Unauthorized” conduct is not always wrongful
as the following discussion demonstrates.
The robustness and availability of each of the three sets of rules
depends to a significant extent on context and, particularly in the
case of moral rights, jurisdiction. While moral rights are very
robust in most countries of the European Union, they are much
weaker in the United States; some would argue, however, that
other aspects of American law—such as the laws relating to
trademarks and unfair competition—fill in gaps left by the failure
to adopt broader-based moral rights legislation.5
The interconnections between copyright, moral rights, and
plagiarism may also be a little context- or jurisdiction-specific,
5
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 390–91 (detailing areas of existing American law said
to encompass the equivalent protections to moral rights law).
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although generally Copyright law concerns itself predominantly
with economic rewards, while moral rights and plagiarism have
more to do with the integrity of the work and the author’s right to
be identified with the work. The following discussion briefly
explains how each of the three sets of rules operates, and the
relationship between them. Then the discussion turns to the
proposed taxonomy of borrowing and how each of the rules may or
may not be implicated in different aspects of digital borrowing
conduct.
B. Copyright
The law does not excuse copyright infringement, no
matter
how
fulsome
the
infringer’s
acknowledgment of his copying; but the
acknowledgment will exonerate him of any charge
of plagiarism. Or at least should—because judges
will
sometimes
call
copyright
infringers
“plagiarists” though there is no concealment. This
loose usage erases what is distinctive about
plagiarism, though it illustrates how the right of
copyright has made copying a suspicious activity.6

1. Exclusive Rights
While a detailed discussion of the operation of Copyright law
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is necessary for the reader to
understand the basics to contrast copyright infringement with other
sanctions related to unauthorized borrowing. Though copyright
infringement will often overlap with a moral rights violation and/or
plagiarism, each set of rules has a distinct basis and they do not
always coincide in practice. Copyright is largely concerned with
unauthorized borrowing of the fixed literal expression of an
existing work.7 Thus, technically it should only apply to taking the
6

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 17 (2007).
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 78 (“The Copyright Act has codified the longstanding,
judicially evolved rule that copyright protects the expression of an idea but not the idea
itself.”).

7

956

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:951

exact words of the original author without permission, rather than
the underlying ideas. However, because the test for infringement
utilizes a conception of “substantial similarity” between the
defendant’s work and that of the plaintiff, courts will take into
account some degree of abstraction.8 It is sometimes difficult for
courts to establish when a copyist has taken the original author’s
idea versus her original expression for copyright infringement
purposes.9 Thus, the creation of a work that does not literally copy
the exact expression of the original, but reproduces its noteworthy
concepts (characters, setting, plot points) may also amount to
copyright infringement.10
The copyright statutes in most countries give exclusive rights
to the creator of a work.11 These are property rights—or at least
property-like—that can be transferred to others.12 Thus, the
creator of the work is not necessarily the copyright holder.
Copyright protection generally subsists for the term of the author’s
life plus seventy years thereafter.13 The exclusive rights provided
by copyright include the right to prevent unauthorized
copying/reproduction, public dissemination, and public distribution
of a work.14 In the United States, Copyright law also preserves to
the copyright holder the right to make and control the production
and dissemination of “derivative works.”15
“Derivative work” has been defined by Congress as:

8

Id. at 426–27 (describing the “abstractions” test in applying the concept of
“substantial similarity”).
9
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 (“The line between idea and expression is often
indistinct. How loose must a paragraph be to escape infringing?”).
10
Id. (“Copying a generic plot or a stock character from a novelist, or historical facts
from a historian, is not copyright infringement. But copying details of plot . . . and of
character could well be.”).
11
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 293–94 (describing the exclusive rights given to
copyright holders in the United States under 17 U.S.C. § 106).
12
17 U.S.C. § 204(2) (2012) (formalities required for transfers of copyright interests);
see also LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 216–18.
13
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 226 (“For most works created after January 1, 1978,
the copyright term is measured by the life of the author plus 70 years.”); see also id. at
239 (providing a detailed table of copyright terms for all works under the Copyright Act).
14
17 U.S.C. § 106 (exclusive rights of copyright holders in the United States).
15
Id. § 106(2) (rights in derivative works).
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[A] work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a “derivative work.”16
Derivative works include prequels, sequels, and retellings of
existing works. Thus, they are highly implicated in the fanfiction17
community. “Fanfiction” has exploded since the advent of the
Internet, even though it existed prior to the digital age.18 It
involves creating unauthorized sequels, prequels and retellings of
existing works by fans, generally not for any monetary reward but
purely for the enjoyment of participating in the fandom.19 Most
fanfiction might be described as derivative works.20 However,
16

Id. § 101 (definition of “derivative work”).
See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655 (1997) (“‘Fan fiction,’ broadly speaking, is any
kind of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular culture, such
as a television show, and is not produced as ‘professional’ writing.”); see also Fan
Fiction, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fan_fiction (last visited Dec. 23, 2013)
(“Fan fiction, or fanfiction (often abbreviated to fanfic, or simply fic), is a broadly
defined fan labor term for stories about characters or settings written by fans of the
original work, rather than by the original creator. Works of fan fiction are rarely
commissioned or authorized by the original work’s owner, creator, or publisher; also,
they are almost never professionally published. Due to these works not being published,
stories often contain a disclaimer stating that the creator of the work owns none of the
original characters. Fan fiction is defined by being both related to its subject’s canonical
fictional universe and simultaneously existing outside the canon of that universe. Most
fan fiction writers assume that their work is read primarily by other fans, and therefore
tend to presume that their readers have knowledge of the canon universe (created by a
professional writer) in which their works are based.”).
18
See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 655 (“Fan fiction and organized media fandom have
been traced to the second season of Star Trek in 1967.”).
19
See id. at 657 (“The ethos of fandom is one of community, of shared journeys to
understanding and enjoyment.”); id. at 664 (“Fan fiction is mostly nonprofit, and on the
Web no one has to pay to read it.”).
20
Some of it may also amount to a reproduction or copy of an original work under
broad conceptions of “copying” utilized by judges applying the “substantial similarity”
test with respect to distinctive characters and settings. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 17,
17

958

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:951

much of it is probably excusable under the fair use doctrine of
Copyright law. The role of fanfiction as an unauthorized, but
potentially socially valuable, form of digital borrowing is
considered in more detail in Part II infra. Interestingly, many
authors of works that give rise to active fanfiction communities do
not appear to understand the legal definition of a derivative work,
nor the application of Copyright law to derivative works.
For example, bestselling young adult fantasy author Maggie
Stiefvater makes the following comments about fanfiction on her
website:
I consider [fanfiction] a pretty steep compliment.
So long as I’m acknowledged as the creator of the
original characters and no money is being made on
the derivative fiction, fanfic away! I am not,
however, a fan of derivative works—i.e., fanfic
where my writing is taken word for word with only
the characters or minor details changed. Please
don’t plagiarize!21
Ms. Stiefvater’s description of a “derivative work” as a story
where her writing is taken word for word with only minor details
changed is a far cry from the legal definition of derivative work
found in the copyright legislation. The legal definition is much
broader than Ms. Stiefvater’s conception. Additionally, her final
sentence conflates the creation of unauthorized derivative works
with plagiarism, which is also incorrect. While a derivative work
may or may not identify the author as the creator of the original
work, a plagiarized work generally will not identify the author of
the original work. As Judge Posner has written, “Concealment is
at the heart of plagiarism.”22 The plagiarist conceals the identity of
the author while the copyright infringer may or may not do so.

at 658–59 (“Fan fiction does not involve pure copying. It might infringe on a creator’s
copyright in characters—the unique personalities created to express a concept . . .
Copyright law . . . expanded its reach beyond duplication to looser forms of borrowing,
including the use of well-established characters.”).
21
FAQ, MAGGIE STIEFVATER BLOG, http://maggiestiefvater.com/faq (last visited June
13, 2014).
22
POSNER, supra note 6, at 17.
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2. Fair Use
Some common misconceptions about copyright infringement
generally include: (a) if a copyist did not intend to infringe, her
infringement may be excused; (b) if a copyist made no money, or
did not intend to profit, from an infringement, the infringement
will be excused; (c) if the copyist identifies the author of the
original work, there is no infringement; and (d) remixing,
repurposing, sampling, and fanfiction do not constitute copyright
infringement.
As blanket statements of the law, these assertions are all
incorrect, although each may be correct in specific cases depending
on the circumstances. Taking the assertions in order, copying is a
strict-liability wrong.23
Thus, a defendant’s intentions are
immaterial to infringement, although they may be taken into
account in the determination of damages.24 Financial gain is not an
element of the infringement action per se, although it is an element
of the fair use defense.25 Thus, some noncommercial infringement
may be excused under the fair use doctrine, but a blanket statement
that noncommercial copying is not an infringement is incorrect.
The identification of the original author, while socially
responsible, is not an excuse for infringement. Infringement
involves copying and not attribution or lack thereof. Those issues
are more relevant to claims involving moral rights infringement (in
jurisdictions where a right of attribution action is available).26
They are also relevant to allegations of plagiarism. Finally,
conduct like remixing, repurposing, sampling and fanfiction may
or may not be infringing activities, and may or may not be excused
under the fair use doctrine depending on the context. A blanket
assertion that these activities are always non-infringing or are
always excused by fair use is incorrect.

23

See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 539.
See id. (“In general, infringement with innocent intent is not a defense to a finding
of liability. Outside of one narrowly drawn provision in the Act, infringement of
copyright is a strict liability rule, where intent of the copier is not relevant in determining
the fact of liability.”).
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (Commercial motives of the defendant are part of the
first fair use factor).
26
See infra Part I.C.
24
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As is evident from the above discussion of common
misconceptions of copyright infringement, many arguments
relating to non-infringing conduct assume a broad application of
the fair use defense. This defense is set out in § 107 of the
Copyright Act and is problematic in the sense that its application in
any given case is intended to be flexible. The advantage of
flexibility is, of course, that courts are able to adapt the doctrine to
new contexts such as those arising with new digital technologies
enabling remixing, sampling and repurposing. However, the
downside of flexibility is the uncertainty of a result, which may be
contrasted with the law in some countries that have a more clearly
proscribed “fair dealing” doctrine.27
The American copyright legislation provides that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

27

See Rebecca Tushnet, Q&A with Professor Rebecca Tushnet, DEAR AUTHOR BLOG
(Mar. 21, 2012), http://dearauthor.com/features/essays/qa-with-professor-rebecca-tushnet
(“U.S. fair use is definitely unusual, though it’s been adopted in Israel and several other
countries are at least thinking about adopting it. Outside the U.S., the closest concept is
generally known as ‘fair dealing.’ Fair dealing varies by country; it generally covers
quotation and criticism, and some people have argued that at least highly transformative
fictional works could fall within those categories. Though I’m not an expert in the area,
I’ve read some very interesting analysis of recent German case law, for example,
suggesting that freedom of expression principles justify a broad interpretation of fair
dealing in the case of critical reuses.”).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.28
While the preamble sets out the kinds of situations typically
regarded as fair use in the United States, it is not a blanket
statement that uses of existing works for purposes of criticism,
comment, news reporting and the like will necessarily be found to
be a fair use in any given case. Additionally, there is nothing in
the preamble that contemplates the kinds of uses that have become
popular in the digital age including sampling, remixing,
repurposing, and fanfiction.
The four fair use factors are the key to determining whether or
not a defendant’s use of a work is excusable under the doctrine.
Factors one and four are often given paramount weight by modern
courts.29 Each of these factors relies to a significant extent on the
economics of the defendant’s use, and the impact of that use on
existing or potential markets for the work. This is probably where
a lot of the confusion about noncommercial works comes into the
equation. Because economic elements are contemplated in fair use
factors one and four, many borrowers of works assume that
noncommercial uses are necessarily excused and acceptable under
Copyright law. However, as noted above, the fair use factors are
applied flexibly and even a noncommercial use may amount to a
copyright infringement.
While not stated in the statute itself, the first fair use factor has
come to incorporate a concept of “transformative use.”30 Courts
have held that where a defendant’s use “transforms” the plaintiff’s
work by adding new insights or ways of looking at the work, it is
more likely to be considered a fair use.31 In recent years, cases
28

17 U.S.C. § 107.
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 481 (“The case law frequently states that [the fourth
fair use] factor is the single most important element of fair use . . . . The fourth factor is
related in one way or another to the other three factors, but perhaps most closely to the
first factor where presumption of harm arises from commercial use of the copyrighted
work.”).
30
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10.13 (2010) (explaining the
concept of transformative use and its application under the first fair use factor).
31
See, e.g-, Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540–41
(S.D.N.Y 2008) (“Most critical to the inquiry under the first fair use factor is ‘whether
and to what extent the new work is transformative.’ Specifically, the court asks ‘whether
the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original creation, or instead adds
29
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involving digital technology have extended the notion of
transformative use of the work itself to what might be termed
transformative functionality of the work, even in cases where the
defendant may be a profit-making enterprise like the Google
search engine.32 In a number of cases involving search engines,
for example, courts have held that even verbatim reproductions of
entire works in search results may be excused by fair use largely
because of the ability of search engines to allow easier access to
works and, in the case of literary works, data mining of those
works.33
The application of the notion of transformative use in the
context of the first fair use factor, along with the application of the
other fair use factors to various types of digital borrowing are
considered in more detail in Parts II and III infra. For the purposes
of distinguishing the basic elements of copyright infringement
from those of moral rights infringement and plagiarism within the
context of this discussion, it is simply necessary to understand that
Copyright law is a strict liability tort that prevents unauthorized
reproductions, disseminations, displays and derivative works based
on preexisting works where the defendant’s conduct is not
excusable under the fair use defense.34
C. Moral Rights
The word create . . . derives from the Latin verb
creo, which means “to give birth to” . . . . The
concept that an author “gives birth” to her artistic
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.’ The fair use doctrine seeks to protect a secondary
work if it ‘adds value to the original if [copyrightable expression in the original work] is
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings,’ because such a work contributes to the enrichment of
society.” (citations omitted)).
32
See id. at 541 (“Courts have found a transformative purpose both where the
defendant combines copyrighted expression with original expression to produce a new
creative work, . . . and where the defendant uses a copyrighted work in a different context
to serve a different function than the original.”).
33
See Authors Guild Inc. v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
34
Other copyright defenses, such as first-sale/exhaustion are not relevant to this
discussion.

2014]

A TAXONOMY OF BORROWING

963

creations provides the foundation of the
insurmountable connection between an author and
her work.35
Moral rights have not become a large part of American law,
even though the United States is technically required to implement
moral rights as a condition of becoming a signatory to the Berne
Convention. Some commentators argue that the United States is
not in compliance with its Berne obligations to implement moral
rights legislation.36 The United States government’s failure to
implement additional moral rights legislation outside of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 suggests that it is relying on the current
pastiche of copyright, trademark, and unfair competition principles
to provide compliance with the country’s Berne obligations.37
Because moral rights are not a mainstay of American law, and
because the author has addressed them in detail in a previous
Article,38 they are only briefly canvassed here for the purposes of
distinguishing them from copyright infringement and plagiarism.
The discussion in Parts II and III refers to areas in which moral
rights legislation might fill some of the gaps currently existing in
the American regulatory matrix for protecting authors’ rights. The
author of this Article has previously concluded that moral rights
legislation is not likely to be a particularly effective avenue for

35

ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 13–14 (2010).
36
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 399 (“[W]hatever one thinks of the [Visual Artists
Rights Act], it is doubtful that it complies with our obligations under Berne.”).
37
Id. at 389 (“Although American Copyright law has never adopted an integrated
version of the moral right, the concept has made its way incrementally into the law in
three ways. First, an author’s integrity and arbitration rights have been protected
piecemeal by various bodies of state and federal law. Second, about a dozen states have
passed statutes explicitly recognizing the moral rights of visual artists. Third, in the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, federal law has followed the lead of state law by
protecting the integrity and attribution rights of visual artists.”).
38
See generally Lipton, supra note 3 (drawing substantively on the work of Professor
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and Professor Neil Netanel in considering the possibility of
developing moral rights legislation for the United States).
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protecting authors’ rights in their original creations in the United
States.39
While the law in many European Union countries contemplates
the existence of a wide variety of moral rights,40 only two rights
are required to be enacted into domestic law by signatories to the
Berne Convention. They are the right of attribution (or paternity)
and the right of integrity.41 The former relates to the creator’s right
to claim authorship of the work, while the latter relates to the
author’s right to “object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to” the
work.42 The Berne Convention also provides that any such
distortion or mutilation must be “prejudicial to the [author’s] honor
or reputation.”43 However, there is little guidance as to what
would be considered prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation
in this context.
The right of attribution is closely related to plagiarism in the
sense that each of these wrongs involves either failing to attribute a
source or falsely attributing a source. Obviously, in countries
where the right of attribution is available as a cause of action,
authors can pursue legal recourse in the courts. In jurisdictions
where such a right is not available to authors, however, such
creators must rely on academic and market conceptions of
plagiarism, or honor codes in academic and other settings where
they might be enforced institutionally. Where plagiarism is
asserted in the commercial marketplace, market forces (such as
consumer outcry) may give an easier and more effective remedy
than legal action because a publisher may be pressured or shamed

39

Id. at 580 (concluding that even if the United States adopted a broader conception of
moral rights, such laws would be unlikely to assist many contemporary fiction authors
address the kinds of unauthorized borrowing with which they have expressed concerns in
recent years in the digital context).
40
Id. at 544 (including the right to refuse to create, the right to create and publish in
any form desired, the right to withdraw or destroy a work, the prohibition against
excessive criticism, and the prohibition against other injuries to the creator’s personality).
41
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1),
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
42
Id.
43
Id.
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into withdrawing a plagiarized work from sale relatively
promptly.44
Where a failure to properly attribute work occurs in the context
of unauthorized copying, as is often the case, a copyright action
may also be available. For example, in a highly publicized case
several years ago, popular author Dan Brown was accused of
copyright infringement with respect to material in his bestseller
The Da Vinci Code, which had allegedly been borrowed without
attribution from a previous work.45
The right of integrity is in many ways the moral rights
correspondent to the derivative works right in Copyright law. Both
have to do with altering an original work. However, the central
thrust and underlying doctrine of the two actions is different. The
derivative works right is based on protecting the right to control
economic markets for a work and is the exclusive right of the
copyright holder, whether or not that entity is the author of the
work.46 In the case of many commercial literary works—as well as
academic texts—the copyright holder is the publisher, rather than
the author.
In contrast, the moral right of integrity is essentially a right of
the author, regardless of whether the author has assigned the
copyright to another entity.47 It is a right personal to the author to
prevent mutilations of a work, or representations of the work that
do not meet with the author’s approval.48 In this sense, the right of
integrity can actually interfere with a copyright holder’s ability to
commercially exploit the work.49 If the author objects to the
44

See infra Part I.D.
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 (“[D]an Brown, the author of The Da Vinci Code,
who was sued for copyright infringement by the authors of an earlier book on the grounds
that he’d stolen their idea of Jesus Christ having married Mary Magdalene and fathered
children by her, won the suit.”).
46
See 4 PATRY, supra note 30, § 12:1 (explanation of rights in derivative works).
47
See id. § 23:23 (explaining moral rights of integrity and attribution, and their
waivability as a matter of international Copyright law).
48
See id.
49
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 400 (“Moral rights protection will inherently clash
with the way many works are created in cultural and entertainment industries such as
moviemaking, publishing, and broadcasting. These intensely collaborative endeavors are
exploited through subsidiary markets. For example, motion pictures are abridged for
television, textbooks are revised and translated, and music is synchronized, adapted, and
45
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copyright holder’s plans for use of the work and the right of
integrity is implicated, the author can—absent a contractual
provision preventing such a course of action—bring an action to
prevent the publisher’s activities.
For example, if a copyright holder wanted to authorize a ghost
writer to write a sequel or a prequel to an existing work and the
original author objected to the new work on moral rights grounds,
that author may have an action available to prevent the new work
in a country where the right was available and where it had not
been modified or excluded by contract. In most cases, the rights
are modified or excluded by contract in these kinds of situations
although some countries’ laws do not allow for waiver of a moral
right by an original creator.50
Even though it appears that moral rights could have a
significant impact on downstream works like prequels, sequels and
retellings or remixes of existing works, the reality is that moral
rights protection tends to be weak in practice. Authors often do
not have the financial wherewithal or legal knowledge to exercise
such rights in countries where they are available. The rights are
only available in limited jurisdictions, and even within those
jurisdictions authors are often contractually required to waive the
rights when they contract with commercial publishers.
D. Plagiarism
Plagiarism is attracting increasing attention, though
whether this is because it is becoming more
broadcast in a multiplicity of forms. These lucrative derivative markets, which attract
significant investment into the entertainment and cultural industries, are regulated by
contractual agreement. But an expansive moral rights concept, presenting a constant
threat of legal challenge brought about by any one or more collaborators, would tend to
undermine the economic expectations and the delicate allocation of rights achieved
through private negotiation between authors, users, and labor unions. The result may be
less financial support for such collaborate artistic endeavors, ultimately harming the
public interest.”).
50
See, e.g., Mrinalini Kochupillai, Moral Rights Under Copyright Laws: A Peep into
Policy—Part 1, SPICY IP BLOG (Dec. 4, 2007), http://spicyip.com/2007/12/moral-rightsunder-copyright-laws-peep.html (discussing the waivability of moral rights under Indian
intellectual property statutes and comparing this issue with legislation in other
jurisdictions).
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common, or because its boundaries are becoming
vague and contested, or because it is being detected
more often (digitization has made it at once easier
to commit and easier to detect) are among the many
questions about it that call for investigation.51
While not giving rise to a legal action, plagiarism is garnering
much attention in the digital world. This may be because, as Judge
Posner posits, plagiarism is both easier to commit and easier to
detect since the advent of digital technologies.52 It may also be
because more and more people are creating literary and artistic
works online and creation often involves borrowing which is, in
many instances, uncredited. Thus, the incidence of plagiarism in
society overall is likely increasing exponentially.
A brief survey of attitudes to unauthorized digital borrowing
suggests that those involved in creative remixing activities online
often confuse copyright infringement and plagiarism.53 This may
also explain the increased focus on the concept of plagiarism in the
digital world. Even successful professional authors often conflate
copyright infringement with plagiarism. Recall, for example,
Maggie Stiefvater’s comments equating a derivative work with
plagiarism.54
Because plagiarism is not, strictly speaking, a legal wrong,
there is no statutory definition of the term. It appears in a number
of institutional honor codes, and is clearly a matter of concern in
the commercial publishing world.55 However, its contours are
vague.56 In describing the concept, Judge Posner notes that while
typical dictionary definitions contemplate that plagiarism is akin to
“literary theft,”57 this description is incomplete in several respects,
including: (a) it is possible to plagiarize works other than literary
51

POSNER, supra note 6, at 9.
Id.
53
See Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright, Plagiarism, and Emerging Norms in Digital
Publishing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2014).
54
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55
See infra Part II.C.
56
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 11 (“‘[P]lagiarism’ turns out to be difficult to define.”).
57
Id.
52
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works;58 (b) plagiarism can occur without theft because “stealing”
a work does not deprive the author or her readers of the work;59
but, (c) plagiarism is more than borrowing because the “borrowed”
matter is not returned.60
Posner acknowledges that an important aspect of plagiarism, at
least with respect to literary works, is that it tends to occur in cases
where the plagiarist copies either expression or ideas without
acknowledgment of the original source “so that readers of the new
work are invited to think that [the copied] features are the
invention or discovery of the plagiarist.”61 Plagiarism thus differs
from copyright in the sense that it involves either expression or
ideas, or both. In other words, plagiarism extends to noncopyrightable features of a work such as the underlying ideas when
they are presented in a new work without attribution as to source.
Posner’s conception of plagiarism, and indeed that which is
embodied in many honor codes, invokes the concept of fraud on
the reader—the idea that the reader is being misled as to the
provenance of particular expressions or ideas.62 Thus, he suggests
that plagiarism does not necessarily occur in contexts where there
is no acknowledgment of the original source, but the readers of the
new work are “indifferent.”63 In other words, “they may be
deceived, but the deception has no consequences.”64 He gives the
example of textbook authors. Many textbooks, notably high
school texts, do not cite all their sources because “there is no
pretense of originality—rather the contrary: the most reliable
textbook is one that confines itself to ideas already well accepted
by experts in the field.”65
Posner also suggests that plagiarism rightfully involves a
“reliance” interest in the sense that the plagiarist’s activities, along
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at 11–12.
61
Id. at 14.
62
Id. at 19 (describing plagiarism as conduct that is “deceitful in the sense of
misleading the intended readers”).
63
Id. at 18.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 18–19 (noting that “since students have little or no interest in the origins of the
ideas they are studying, source references would merely clutter the exposition”).
59
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with being deceitful as to source, induce some kind of reliance in a
consumer, such as purchasing a book she would not otherwise
have purchased if she knew it was really the work of another
writer.66 He suggests that:
The reader has to care about being deceived about
authorial identity in order for the deceit to cross the
line to fraud and thus constitute plagiarism. More
precisely, he has to care enough that had he known
he would have acted differently.
There are
innumerable intellectual deceits that do little or no
harm because they engender little or no reliance.
They arouse not even tepid moral indignation, and
so they escape the plagiarism label.67
He gives the example of judges who sign opinions that are
actually written predominantly or completely by their law clerks
without attribution.68 Generally, this conduct is not regarded as
plagiarism.
Likewise, Posner suggests that celebrities and
politicians who employ the services of ghost writers for their
memoirs are not engaging in plagiarism as the public does not
expect the celebrities to be the “real” authors, but merely expects
them to endorse the contents of the books.69
These situations may be contrasted with some of the conduct
considered in Part II that involves remixing fictional works by
cutting and pasting passages from existing texts into a new text and
changing character names before selling the work as a completely
new work without attribution of the original sources. This may
amount to copyright infringement, but it would also likely satisfy
Posner’s definition of plagiarism because it is deceitful in its
failure to provide attribution. At the same time, the plagiarist
intends that the consumer rely on the deceit and buy her book
rather than, or alongside, the original works. The plagiarist seeks
to have the consumer act differently in reliance on her deceit by
purchasing a book she would not otherwise have purchased had
she known the truth.
66
67
68
69

Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 24–26.
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While most participants in online publishing communities
probably do not think through the concept of plagiarism in as much
detail as Judge Posner, his insights are instructive as to the
essential differences between plagiarism and copyright
infringement. Plagiarism is not unimportant in digital publishing
marketplaces simply because it does not ground a legal cause of
action. In fact, some claims of plagiarism can have a more
immediate and greater impact in redressing a perceived wrong than
a copyright claim. Claims of plagiarism may cause the market to
respond quickly and often decisively, while claims of copyright
infringement may take significant time and expense to work their
way through the courts before an outcome is reached. Even if the
case ultimately settles, the focus on the legal cause of action can
lead parties to wait to see how the judicial winds are blowing
before engaging in attempts to negotiate a settlement.
II. TAXONOMY OF DIGITAL BORROWING
A. Anecdotal Evidence of Online Borrowing
One thing missing from much of the previous discussion of
Copyright law, plagiarism, and moral rights law (in jurisdictions
where moral rights apply to literary endeavors) is an unpacking of
the different categories of borrowing with which authors and
copyright holders may be concerned in the digital age. In a
previous Article, the author proposed a new “taxonomy” of
borrowing drawn from practices currently occurring in the world
of digital publishing.70 This discussion extends the taxonomy and
examines in more detail the appropriate regulatory approaches to
each category of borrowing with a view to determining whether a
more nuanced approach to unauthorized digital borrowing may be
developed in the future. The taxonomy is drawn from anecdotal
evidence of conduct currently taking place in the digital publishing
world.
From a survey of online blogs and email discussions with
writers and publishers, the author has ascertained that there are at
least five different classes of unauthorized (but not necessarily
70

See Lipton, supra note 53.
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“wrongful”) online borrowing about which writers and copyright
holders may express concerns. It is important to note that these
categories are based on practical usages of works in the digital
publishing industry rather than on legal distinctions. Thus, the
applications of regulatory principles to the categories will overlap
while the categories themselves may be practically distinct with
respect to the concerns they raise for authors and copyright
holders.
The categories comprise:
(a) Direct literal copying of an entire text which
basically equates to traditional “piracy.” The
resulting works are likely perfect or near-perfect
market substitutes for the original works.
(b) Direct literal copying of an entire text for
functionally
transformative
purposes
in
circumstances where the copies do not displace the
original works in the market.
(c) Copying of snippets of text usually from
multiple sources in the process of creating a new
work.
(d) Creating a derivative work based on the
characters, settings, or plot points of an existing
work without literally copying text, and with the
intention of commercially profiting from the new
work.
(e) Creating a derivative work—as in (d) above—
with no intention to commercially profit from the
new. This category largely refers to the creation of
fanfiction.
These classes of conduct obviously overlap to a significant
extent, particularly in terms of the legal analysis that might be
applied, although the results of the legal analysis may differ from
class to class. Categories (d) and (e) are arguably two sides of the
same coin—commercial versus noncommercial derivative works.
They have been separated for the purposes of this discussion
because of the notable online norms that have developed in relation
to noncommercial fanfiction as opposed to, say, the writing of
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unauthorized commercially-viable prequels or sequels to an
existing work.71
The distinction between the two classes of conduct may be
illustrated by comparing the copyright litigation and large sums of
money involved in the dispute over whether Alice Randall’s
retelling of Gone with the Wind (entitled The Wind Done Gone)
amounted to copyright infringement72 with the voluminous amount
of non-contentious Gone with the Wind fanfiction freely available
online.73 It should be noted here that the actual Gone with the
Wind litigation was framed in terms of an infringement of the
reproduction right, rather than the derivative works right.
However, the court focused on the notion of markets for derivative
works in its analysis of the fourth fair use factor—examining the
extent to which the defendant’s work might encroach into markets
that the original copyright holder may want to reserve for
authorized sequels and retellings of the original story.74
Categories (a) and (c) in the taxonomy may also be difficult to
distinguish in practice as both involve direct and literal copying
from an existing original work. Thus, each sounds like a per se
copyright infringement. While both classes of conduct likely do
amount to copyright infringement depending on the
circumstances—and in category (c), for example, the amount of
the original work taken by the copyist—they raise different
concerns in different contexts. Though there is little doubt that a
direct literal copy of an entire text, particularly when distributed
online, is problematic for the copyright holder as it is a perfect
market substitute for the original work, there may be more doubt
with regard to the borrowing of snippets to create a new work.
One might argue that a new work constructed from snippets of
multiple existing works actually does contribute something new to
the marketplace of ideas and might be protected as a
transformative use under the fair use doctrine. However, there will
be cases where the remixing of existing works to create a new
71

See id.
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
73
See, e.g., Archive of Gone with the Wind, FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.
net/book/Gone-with-the-Wind (last visited June 13, 2014).
74
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1274–76.
72
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work will be very similar to traditional piracy,75 particularly if
intended to substitute for, or potentially detract sales from the
original works.
Of course, as noted above,76 sometimes direct literal copying of
an entire work will be excused by the fair use doctrine in
circumstances where the resulting copy is not a market substitute
for the original work. The search engine cases are obvious
examples of this,77 and this is the purpose of category (b). This
category differentiates full text literal copying that threatens the
market for the original work with full text literal copying that does
not create such a threat because of the lack of actual or potential
market displacement. While the copyist’s purposes in category (b)
cases may be commercial, the products of the copying do not
threaten actual or potential markets for the original work.78
The most effective way to demonstrate the contribution a
taxonomy of borrowing might make to the development of legal
and market regulations is to provide concrete examples of each
different class of conduct. Such examples evidence the different
dynamics that arise between original creators, copyright holders,
and copyists in different situations, and support the author’s
contention that the taxonomy might give rise to a more nuanced
approach to the regulation of unauthorized digital borrowing.
B. Verbatim Copying of Entire Text
Categories (a) and (b) in the proposed taxonomy each deal with
verbatim copying of an entire text. The categories might therefore
be condensed into one single category. However, this may be
doing a disservice to ways in which Copyright law, in particular,
has developed in recent years in light of the recognition of the
“functional transformativeness” test that has crept into the factor
one analysis of the fair use doctrine. While verbatim copying of an
entire text could never amount to a derivative work—because it
involves copying the actual text, not deriving something new from
75

See infra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.B.2.
77
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 24–26.
78
See Authors Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“Google does not sell its scans, and the scans do not replace the books.”).
76
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it—it may nevertheless allow consumers to see the work in a new
way or in a new context.
The purpose of the distinction between categories (a) and (b) is
to differentiate what might be regarded as good old-fashioned
piracy (category (a)) from more socially beneficial uses of a work
(category (b)). Little need be said about category (a). The law
would typically deal with it as a copyright infringement both in
terms of the actual copying of the original work and in terms of
any subsequent dissemination of the work. The resulting copies
would likely, or potentially, serve as market substitutes for the
original, particularly in the age of near-perfect digital copies of a
text file.
On the other hand, category (b) conduct—while involving
verbatim copies of entire works—does not create market
substitutes for these works. Category (b) contemplates activities
such as the Google book project and the Hathitrust digitization
project for library materials.79 While digitization in the search
engine or library context does involve verbatim copying of entire
works, there is no (or very little) market substitution effect. In
fact, the activities of the copyists may assist consumers to locate
and utilize legally disseminated copies of the original works in new
and socially beneficial ways. The aim of the copying is to assist
individuals to locate and use original works more easily and
effectively. This conduct has been regarded by courts as excused
under Copyright law by the application of the fair use doctrine. In
the Google books situation, for example, the court made much of
the first fair use factor to hold that Google’s digitization of the
plaintiff’s members’ books is transformative in the sense that it
promotes research and expands public access to books.80
While this result under Copyright law is laudable, the problem
for future developments involving digitized literary texts is that it
79

See Authors Guild Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351 HB, 2013 WL 603193
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013).
80
Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (“Google’s use of the copyrighted works is highly
transformative. Google Books digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a
comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers, and others find
books. Google Books has become an important tool for libraries and librarians as citecheckers as it helps to identify and find books. The use of book text to facilitate search
through the display of snippets is transformative.”).
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relies on a court’s finding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
work is a fair use. Such a finding can only be made after the fact
in the context of copyright litigation. There is no ex ante guidance
available as to whether a particular verbatim coy is fair use in any
given context. Even the Google books litigation took years to
make its way through the courts and cost the parties plenty of
money and time.81 The litigation raised by the Association of
American Publishers against Google ultimately settled, thus
providing no explicit legal precedent as to the kinds of uses Google
was making of the literary texts in question.82 It was not until the
action raised by the Authors Guild against Google was decided in
2013 that any legal precedent was forthcoming.83
One of the aims of proposing the taxonomy advocated in this
Article is to focus on the classes of conduct that have recently
taken place in the digital world in an attempt to propose more ex
ante guidance as to conduct that should be deemed acceptable.
While it is difficult to formulate a legal rule that would
differentiate acceptable versus unacceptable instances of verbatim
copying of an entire work, some ex ante guidance may be gleaned
from drawing the line between market substitution cases and cases
of copying that are more socially beneficial.
Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively,
commercial motivations per se become extremely important in the
context of categories (c), (d) and (e) of the taxonomy, while they
are arguably less important in distinguishing between category (a)
and (b). Where verbatim copying of an entire work is for a
noncommercial purpose, the resultant copies can still serve as
market substitutes for an original work under category (a) and thus
be considered wrongful. Even if the copying is undertaken for
commercial benefit, it can nevertheless be socially beneficial or
functionally transformative under category (b), and thus be
excusable. Thus, while commercial motives may be a key factor in
81

The lawsuit commenced in 2005. See Elinor Mills, Authors Guild Sues Google Over
Library Project, CNET NEWS (Sept. 21, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/Authors-Guild-suesGoogle-over-library-project/2100-1030_3-5875384.html.
82
See Claire Cain Miller, Google Deal Gives Publishers a Choice: Digitize or Not,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/technology/google-andpublishers-settle-over-digital-books.html?_r=0.
83
See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282.
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other areas of the taxonomy to distinguish good conduct from bad,
they are perhaps less decisive and should be given less weight in
cases of verbatim copying of entire works. The key to these cases
appears to be market substitution (or lack thereof) as well as the
potential for transformative functionality of the work.
C. Literal Copying of Snippets
I love Easy by Tammara Webber and so do
hundreds of thousands of other readers.
Unfortunately, one Jordan Williams recognized this
and thought, hmmm, I’ll just incorporate whole
swaths of text from Webber’s famous and much
beloved book. Worse, Jordan William’s book is
selling like mad. It’s 58 in the US Kindle store, as
of this writing.84
It is possible that describing category (c) of the taxonomy as
borrowing of “snippets” is a misnomer in that it creates an
impression of minimal taking from another’s work. In fact,
borrowing of multiple snippets, often from various different
sources, to create a new work can be—and has, in the past, been—
highly problematic for the creators of original works and
consumers alike. Because of the inherent consumer deception in
taking snippets from pre-existing works and repackaging them as a
new work, this conduct tends to be described as plagiarism,
although in many cases it also amounts to copyright infringement.
Taking snippets from existing works and repurposing them in a
new work can obviously infringe the reproduction, public
dissemination, and derivative works rights that are exclusively
reserved to the author under § 106 of the Copyright Act.85
One very high-profile example of this class of conduct in the
“bricks and mortar” publishing world occurred in 2006 when then84

Jane Litte, The Plagiarizing of Tammara Webber’s Easy by @JordinBWilliams,
DEAR AUTHOR BLOG (June 26, 2013), http://dearauthor.com/book-reviews/theplagiarizing-of-tammara-webbers-easy-by-jordin-williams.
85
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright owners in their
works).
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Harvard student Kaavya Viswanathan published a book entitled
How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life.86 It was
published by major publishing house under a two-book deal.87
Viswanathan was given an advance of $500,000, and sold the
movie rights to Dreamworks.88 The book was later withdrawn
from the shelves after claims were made that Viswanathan had
copied passages verbatim from existing authors including Meg
Cabot, Megan McCafferty, and Salman Rushdie.89 Her publishing
contract was cancelled and existing copies of the book were
recalled and destroyed.90
This situation is a good example of the way in which an
assertion of plagiarism may be a more powerful incentive for a
publisher to act than a threat of copyright infringement. Where
plagiarism is asserted, there is the implication that the publisher
has been involved in something “dishonorable,” thereby interfering
with its credibility in the market. Copyright, on the other hand,
may be regarded more as a legal matter, rather than a matter of
honor. Where a copyright infringement claim is made against an
author or publisher, the participants in the action may leave the
matter to their lawyers and the courts, rather than be concerned
about their reputation or honor in the field. As copyright is a strictliability wrong,91 it arguably does not carry the same dishonorable
connotations as an allegation of plagiarism.
In many ways, the Viswanathan case is an easy example
because the author as well as the publisher obviously acted with
commercial motivations. Clearly, given the size of the advance
paid to the author, the publisher had high commercial hopes for the
book and was obviously the subject of major embarrassment when
the claims of plagiarism were publicly made.92 Other cases may
not be so simple. For example, cases where a self-published
86

See POSNER, supra note 6, at 3.
See id.
88
See id.
89
See id.; see also How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/How_Opal_Mehta_Got_Kissed,_Got_Wild,_and_Got_a_Lif
e (last visited June 13, 2014).
90
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 3.
91
See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 539.
92
Embarrassment is inferred here from the fact that the book was removed from sale.
87
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author borrows smaller snippets from less well known works.
Such conduct is not necessarily any less “wrongful” than
Viswanathan’s activities. However, it may not be as high profile
and a self-published author may be less equipped to act to remedy
the situation than a major publishing house.
Of course, even a self-published author may rely on a digital
distributor such as Amazon, Barnes and Noble, or Kobo to
disseminate her works. Thus, in the digital world, the service
providers that enable self-publishing may take on the role of
monitoring unauthorized borrowing that was previously the task of
traditional publishers.93 There is some anecdotal evidence that the
self-publishing author community and its readers rely on
companies like Amazon to take on such a role, raising concerns
about the extent to which these service providers are sufficiently
active in detecting and preventing plagiarism and copyright
infringement, or at least responding to allegations of such
conduct.94
For example, in 2013 a similar situation arose in the digital
self-publishing world as the 2006 “real world” example of
Viswanathan’s book. A self-published romance author working
under the pseudonym “Jordin Williams” released a book that
included large snippets taken verbatim from two previous selfpublished bestsellers: Easy by Tammara Webber, and Beautiful
Disaster by Jamie McGuire.95 The two latter books were
ultimately picked up by commercial publishers and marketed
through traditional channels.96
As soon as the online community detected the copying an
outcry arose in the blogosphere.97 A grassroots campaign ensued
advocating that those who purchased Williams’ book demand
refunds from Amazon and that the book be withdrawn from sale.98
The campaign resulted in the refunds being made and the book

93
94
95
96
97
98

See Lipton, supra note 53.
See id.
See id.
JAMIE MCGUIRE, BEAUTIFUL DISASTER (2012); TAMMARA WEBBER, EASY (2012).
See Lipton, supra note 53.
See id.
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being withdrawn by the distributor, Amazon.99 The online
discussions evidenced confusion about whether the concern was
truly copyright infringement or plagiarism, but the bottom line was
that most agreed that taking another’s work for commercial gain
without attribution was wrongful.100 Thus, even though the players
and dynamics were a little different in the online situation to the
Viswanathan situation, the results were similar. The digital book
was ultimately removed from sale and purchase prices were
refunded to consumers, as they had acted in reliance on the
deception that this was an original work by Williams.
Category (c) conduct obviously differs from category (a)
conduct in that the resulting copy here is not a perfect market
substitute for the original work. It is rather a remix of several
original works that may or may not appeal to those who would
otherwise have purchased the original works. Category (c) also
differs from categories (a) and (b) in that commercial motivations
seem to be more significant in category (c) than in the previous
categories. Authors and consumers expressed concern that a
copyist should not be allowed to profit commercially from stealing
snippets of others’ work and repurposing them.101
In contrast, we saw in comparing categories (a) and (b) that
commercial motives were less significant. Noncommercial copies
of entire works could be perfect market substitutes for originals
and thus wrongful, while commercial copies of entire works could
be socially beneficial—as in the search engine context—and thus
not wrongful even if done for commercial purposes. Another
important distinction between category (c) conduct and the
previous categories in the taxonomy is that category (c) conduct
tends by default to include lack of attribution to the borrowed
works. Thus, it is more likely to amount to plagiarism—and to an
infringement of the moral right of attribution in jurisdictions where
such a right is available to authors of literary works.
D. Derivative Works

99
100
101

See id.
See id.
See id.
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“It’s not illegal.” All the arguments came easily to
Cath; they were the justification for all fanfiction.
“I don’t own the characters, but I’m not trying to
sell them, either.”102
As noted previously, the statutory definition of “derivative
work” refers to: “[A] work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”103 In the
context of literary works, derivative works tend to be prequels,
sequels, and retellings of a story from another perspective. Alice
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone,104 for example, retells aspects of
Margaret Mitchell’s classic Gone with the Wind105 from a new
perspective.
When Mitchell’s estate brought a copyright
infringement action against Randall, it was interestingly under the
reproduction right rather than the derivative works right.106 Thus,
the court struggled with applying the “substantial similarity”
doctrine to a work that did not literally reproduce verbatim text
from the original.107 Randall’s work could more easily have been
characterized as a “derivative work” which might have made the
infringement analysis somewhat easier.
Generally, unauthorized derivative works may raise the specter
of all three of the regulatory regimes applying to unauthorized
borrowing discussed in Part I: copyright infringement; moral rights
infringement (where available for literary works); and plagiarism.
Under American copyright legislation, the right to create derivative
works is an exclusive right of the copyright holder.108 In
jurisdictions in which moral rights are available to authors of
literary works, a derivative work may infringe the right of integrity
102

RAINBOW ROWELL, FANGIRL 107–08 (2013).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
104
ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2002).
105
MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
106
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
107
See id. at 1266–68 (discussing copyrightability of characters and scenes in the
absence of verbatim copying).
108
17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
103
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(where the author is attributed, but the story is retold in an
unacceptable manner).109 If the copyist does not attribute the
original author, the right of attribution may be implicated,110
although derivative works generally are associated with the
original work, unlike category (c) conduct where the source works
may well be concealed.
Plagiarism is a more complicated issue with respect to
derivative works than with respect to category (c) conduct. As
derivative works usually expressly or implicitly identify the
underlying source work, plagiarism in the sense of deceit against
the consumer is unlikely to be an issue. Plagiarism tends to give
the impression that the copyist’s work is original to the copyist.
Derivative works inherently bring the original work to the reader’s
mind.
The key distinction between categories (d) and (e) in the above
taxonomy in many ways relates to the commercial motivation—or
lack thereof—behind the creation of a particular derivative work.
Where the work is intended to be commercialized, and thus may
impinge on the copyright holder’s control of markets expressly
reserved to it in the Copyright Act, the conduct is more likely to be
problematic than when the work is noncommercial. In the
commercially-focused cases, the next factor to focus on (after
commercial motive) will likely be transformativeness of the kind
traditionally associated with the first fair use factor in copyright
law: transformative of the substance of the work to provide new
meanings or insights. If the new work is commercially motivated,
the next question will be whether it is a sufficiently new
contribution to literature in this sense.
Of course, if the copyright holder does not object to
commercialization of a derivative work, no litigation will ensue
and the courts will not have cause to consider any of these issues.
Recent examples are the best-selling Fifty Shades of Grey
trilogy,111 and the popular Gabriel’s Inferno trilogy,112 both of

109

See 7 PATRY, supra note 30, §23:23.
See id.
111
E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES DARKER
(2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES FREED (2012).
110
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which were originally based on noncommercial Twilight
fanfiction.113 In neither case did the copyright holders raise
concerns about copyright infringement. If they had, much would
have turned on the legal analysis of the traditional
transformativeness test applied under the first fair use factor.
These exceptions aside, noncommercial derivative works in the
literary sphere tend to arise in the context of fanfiction authors who
do not attempt to commercialize their work. These derivative
works are typically noncommercial retellings of existing works
engaged in by members of the work’s fandom.114 The rise of
Internet communications led to an explosion of fanfiction
communities.115
A recent (traditionally published) young adult romance novel,
Fangirl by Rainbow Rowell, actually revolves around a
protagonist—Cath—who is a noted fanfiction author and who has
trouble, when she enrolls in a fiction-writing class at college,
creating her own characters and situations.116 At one point in the
narrative, Cath explains to her bemused fiction writing professor
her comfort level with writing fanfiction as opposed to her own
original work:
[“]But I don’t want to write my own fiction,” Cath
said, as emphatically as she could. “I don’t want to
write my own characters or my own worlds—I
don’t care about them.” She clenched her fists in her
lap. “I care about Simon Snow. And I know he’s
not mine, but that doesn’t matter to me. I’d rather
pour myself into a world I love and understand than
try to make something up out of nothing.[”]117

112

SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S INFERNO (2012); SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S
RAPTURE (2012); SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S REDEMPTION (2013).
113
See Tushnet, supra note 27 (discussing the derivation of “Masters of the
Universe”—precursor story to the Gabriel’s Inferno trilogy—and “Fifty Shades of Grey”
from Twilight fanfiction).
114
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115
See Tushnet, supra note 17, 651–52 (noting the broad accessibility of user-generated
fanfiction content since the advent of the Internet).
116
ROWELL, supra note 102.
117
Id.
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During the story, Cath comes to terms with the place of
fanfiction in her development as a creative artist and learns the
difference between, and importance of, being able to create her
own original characters and stories if she seeks a career as a
legitimate fiction writer.118 Cath’s story mirrors the true-life
stories of many modern-day authors who initially cut their teeth on
fanfiction before graduating to original fiction. Some examples are
Meg Cabot, author of the bestselling Princess Diaries series,
Cassandra Clare, author of the popular Mortal Instruments series,
and best-selling fantasy author Naomi Novik.119 Of course, E.L.
James and Sylvain Reynard, authors of the Fifty Shades and
Gabriel’s Inferno books are also obviously examples of authors
who transformed a fanfiction interest into a professional writing
career even though their works might technically be derivative
works encroaching on markets arguably reserved to the original
copyright holders under the copyright act. In any event, the ability
to write fanfiction is arguably an important aspect of the
development of new creative artists and should be tolerated, or
arguably encouraged.
In jurisdictions where moral rights protection is available for
authors of literary works, fanfiction may be more problematic,
particularly in terms of the right of integrity. Moral rights do not
generally depend on commercializing a work in competition with
the author, but rather with presenting a work in a light of which the
author does not approve. As noted above, the Berne Convention
additionally contemplates that the new work must damage the
author’s reputation in some way, although this concept is not
defined in the Berne Convention.120 In the absence of specific
moral rights protection for authors of literary works, the legal
position on fanfiction in the United States is arguably easier to deal
with than potentially in countries that have a strong moral rights
jurisprudence.

118

Id.
See Alexander Alter, The Weird World of Fan Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230373420457746441182597
0488.
120
Berne Convention, supra note 41, art. 6bis(1).
119
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While the law relating to fanfiction even in the United States is
not well settled, the weight of opinion seems to be that fanfiction
would qualify as a fair use under copyright law, provided that it is
noncommercial.121 Existing authors differ in their personal
attitudes to fan fiction.122 A number of established traditionally
published authors have acknowledged that writing fanfiction is a
useful way for aspiring authors to become comfortable with the
process of writing, and many do not object to fanfiction based on
their own work provided that it is noncommercial.123 Some
authors—even those who were originally opposed to fanfiction—
now embrace these activities of fans as free advertising and
expressions of the fans’ their affection for, and deep connection to,
the underlying works.124
However, other authors have publicly taken a stance against
fan fiction. Best-selling urban fantasy author Anne Rice has been
an outspoken critic of fanfiction and states on her website that she
does not “allow” fanfiction relating to her works.125 Interestingly,
Anne Rice has licensed derivative works including movies and a
Broadway musical based on her books.126 Thus, it may be that her
real concern is with commercially-oriented derivative works and
not fanfiction per se. This is one reason for the distinction
between commercially motivated derivative works and
noncommercial derivative works in the above taxonomy. It seems
that the commercial motivation is a key to distinguishing works
that are on balance considered socially acceptable from those that
are not.

121

See Alter, supra note 119 (“Most experts agree that fan fiction qualifies as fair use
under Copyright law, provided that it differs substantially from the original and its
creators don’t attempt to profit from it.”).
122
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons
from the Vampire Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. 1 (2010).
123
See Alter, supra note 119.
124
See id.
125
See Lipton, supra note 3, at 551–53 (on Anne Rice’s stance on fanfiction).
126
See Lestat (musical), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lestat_(musical) (last
visited Apr. 11, 2014) (discussing the musical Lestat, based on Rice’s novel The Vampire
Chronicles).
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Compare noncommercial fanfiction with, say, Alice Randall’s
commercially published retelling of Gone with the Wind,127 or the
retelling of J.D. Salinger’s famous Catcher in the Rye by a
Swedish author who attempted to commercially publish a sequel to
the novel starring a geriatric version of the book’s iconic
protagonist, Holden Caulfield.128 While Copyright law may
encourage retellings of literary works for purely expressive
noncommercial purposes, even where the retellings garner their
own large audiences within the fandom, the line becomes more
difficult to cross with respect to conduct that trespasses on markets
reserved by Congress to copyright holders. This approach is
reflected in comments on the blogosphere by participants in the
self-publishing community (writers and readers alike):
You want to fanfic in your world for free—
have at it. But when you sell intellectual property
to a consumer, I truly believe you should be the one
intellectually creating it from beginning to end.129
I think fanfiction and fandoms are great, but once
you try to make a buck off of it you’ve crossed the
line.130
I’m not opposed to fanfic authors
transitioning into published ones. I was there—it’s
a great tool in the growth of an author. But when
you see that you can attract fans, and you decide
you want to be paid for your talent, that’s when it’s
time to let that other person’s world go and create
your own.131
I think fanfiction definitely has a place, but
it’s important for fanfic writers to still be original
and not plagiarize, and it’s equally as important that
127

As noted above, the case was not actually litigated under the derivative works right,
but many would consider an unauthorized retelling of an existing work to be a derivative
work.
128
See BBC News, Sequel to Catcher in the Rye ‘Banned in US,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 13,
2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12181223.
The
Salinger litigation was settled, with banning the sale of the book in the U.S. and Canada
as a condition to the settlement.
129
Stephanie Doyle, Comment No. 177 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013).
130
Ava Lore, Comment No. 185 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013).
131
Stephanie Doyle, Comment No. 192 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013).
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fanfiction doesn’t make money, because it’s not a
wholly original creation.132
Obviously, quoting comments from the blogosphere is not
tantamount to engaging in a detailed statistical or doctrinal analysis
as to how copyright law does, or should, work. Nevertheless, if the
underlying philosophy of Copyright law in the United States is to
promote creativity,133 there is a strong argument for drawing a line
between commercial and noncommercial derivative literary works
in terms of what is permitted under the law. Noncommercial
works appear to encourage creativity within the fandom for an
existing work while additionally serving as free advertising that
draws attention to the original author’s work and may enhance
sales. Commercial work, on the other hand, while it may
encourage creativity in the fandom, potentially detracts from the
existing author’s market by encroaching on a market that is
expressly reserved to the author in the Copyright Act.
A counterargument would be that there should be room in the
market for even commercially motivated derivative works and that
even a commercially published derivative work will increase
interest in the original work and provide free advertising for it. It
is possible, even likely, that readers of, say, Alice Randall’s The
Wind Done Gone, who had never read Gone with the Wind, would
purchase a copy of the original book out of a renewed interest in
the story.134
The derivative work—even if commercially
motivated—will focus more attention on the original work and
may increase the market for the original work or revive the market
for an original work.

132

Kendra, Comment to Why I Have a Problem with Cassandra Clare & Why You
Should Too, LIFE & WHAT-HAVE-YOU BLOG (Mar. 14, 2012, 11:49 AM),
http://bellumina.wordpress.com/2012/03/14/049-why-i-have-a-problem-with-cassandraclare-why-you-should-too.
133
See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 684 (“Copyright’s purpose . . . is to encourage
creativity for the public interest, not only to ensure monopoly profits.”).
134
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Marcus, J., concurring) (“It is . . . possible that The Wind Done Gone will act as a
complement to, rather than a substitute for, Gone with the Wind and its potential
derivatives. Readers of Randall’s book may want to refresh their recollections of the
original. It is not far-fetched to predict that sales of Gone with the Wind have grown
since The Wind Done Gone’s publication.”).
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Nevertheless, the commercial derivative work is more
problematic for Copyright law than a noncommercial derivative
work when applying the fair use doctrine. While both commercial
and noncommercial derivative works are prima facie infringements
of the derivative works right in § 106 of the Copyright Act, the
first fair use factor invites a court to consider the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes. As noted above,135
courts applying this factor also consider the “transformativeness”
of the defendant’s use in the sense of whether or not the use adds
new insights to the existing works.
While both commercial and noncommercial derivative literary
works likely add new insights, noncommercial uses will be given
greater deference as fair uses under the factor that requires courts
to consider the commercial nature of the use. Commercial uses
will, if litigated, put more pressure on the first fair use factor in
considering the concept of transformativeness of the content of the
work. This was a major consideration in the litigation involving
Alice Randall’s derivative work based on Gone with the Wind.136
While the case was litigated under the reproduction right rather
than the derivative works right, the analysis of transformativeness
is equally applicable to either claim.
Transformativeness was also a significant criterion in an
attempt to commercially publish the Harry Potter Lexicon, an
unauthorized work based on a noncommercial website, that
described the characters, places, artifacts, spells, potions and the
like appearing in J.K. Rowling’s bestselling Harry Potter series.137
J.K Rowling and Warner Bros., the producer of the Harry Potter
135

See supra Part I.B.2.
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269 (“The fact that TWDG [The Wind Done Gone] was
published for profit is the first factor weighing against a finding of fair use. However,
TWDG’s for-profit status is strongly overshadowed and outweighed in view of its highly
transformative use of GWTW [Gone with the Wind]’s copyrighted elements.”).
137
Warner Bros Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“The utility of the Lexicon, as a reference guide to a multi-volume work of fantasy
literature, demonstrates a productive use for a different purpose than the original works.
The Lexicon makes the elaborate imaginary world of Harry Potter searchable, item by
item, and gives readers a complete picture of each item that cannot be gleaned by reading
the voluminous series, since the material related to each item is scattered over thousands
of pages of complex narrative and plot.”).
136
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movies, sued the publishers of the Lexicon for copyright
infringement.138 While the plaintiffs argued infringement of both
the reproduction right and the derivative works right, interestingly
the court held there was no infringement of the derivative works
right.139 The plaintiffs succeeded only with respect to the
reproduction right.140
Nevertheless, the fair use analysis in the decision is instructive
for the present discussion of commercialized derivative works.
Ultimately, the court held that the defendant could not avail itself
of the fair use doctrine, and, in so doing, focused much of the
inquiry on the transformative nature of the defendant’s use, noting
that the Lexicon was transformative, but not sufficiently and
consistently transformative to support a fair use defense.141 The
other fair use factors also weighed in the balance against the
defendant, but the transformative use factor was discussed the most
extensively because of the need under copyright law not to stifle
creativity in relation even to pre-existing original works still
protected by copyright.142

138

Id.
Id. at 538 (“A work is not derivative . . . simply because it is “based upon” the
preexisting works.”); id. at 539 (“By condensing, synthesizing, and reorganizing the
preexisting material in an A-to-Z reference guide, the Lexicon does not recast the
material in another medium to retell the story of Harry Potter, but instead gives the
copyrighted material another purpose. That purpose is to give the reader a ready
understanding of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter that appear in
voluminous and diverse sources. As a result, the Lexicon no longer ‘represents [the]
original work[s] of authorship . . . .’ Under these circumstances, and because the Lexicon
does not fall under any example of derivative works listed in the Statute, Plaintiffs have
failed to show that the Lexicon is a derivative work.”).
140
The court held that there was no infringement of the derivative works right by taking
a relatively narrow interpretation of the § 101 definition of “derivative work” from the
Copyright Act. The court held that the Act “seeks to protect works that are ‘recast,
transformed, or adapted’ into another medium, mode, language, or revised version, while
still representing the ‘original work of authorship.’” Id. at 538. Under this interpretation
an unauthorized Lexicon, encyclopedia or guide to an existing work does not meet the
statutory definition of “derivative work.”
141
Id. at 540–46 (detailed analysis of the transformativeness of the Harry Potter
Lexicon).
142
Id. at 540 (“The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the Copyright law’s goal of
‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, ‘would
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.’”).
139
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Factor four of the fair use test also invites courts to consider
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”143 While both commercial and noncommercial
works may positively impact the market for the copyrighted work
by drawing attention to the original work and serving as free
advertising, a commercial work is more likely to be regarded as
infringing on a market reserved to the copyright holder.144 This
factor was also significant in the Harry Potter litigation.145 The
Lexicon was ultimately published in a revised shorter form that
apparently did not infringe copyright.146
III. LESSONS FROM THE TAXONOMY
A. Transformativeness
Several issues emerge from the above discussion about the
different classes of borrowing identified in the taxonomy. As we
might expect, copyright/fair use considerations involving the
transformativeness of the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work
and commercial use made by the defendant are central concerns of
authors and copyright holders. The ability to be attributed as the
author of a given work is also important. However, what is
perhaps less obvious is that not all of these considerations arise
143

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (discussing the significance of commercial
purpose to a finding for or against fair use in a copyright infringement suit).
145
Id. at 550–51 (“[P]ublication of the Lexicon could harm sales of Rowling’s two
companion books. Unless they sought to enjoy the companion books for their
entertainment value alone, consumers who purchased the Lexicon would have scant
incentive to purchase either of Rowling’s companion books, as the information contained
in these short works has been incorporated into the Lexicon almost wholesale. Because
the Lexicon’s use of the companion books is only marginally transformative, the Lexicon
is likely to supplant the market for the companion books . . . . Additionally, the fourth
factor favors Plaintiffs if publication of the Lexicon would impair the market for
derivative works that Rowling is entitled or likely to license. Although there is no
supporting testimony, one potential derivative market that would reasonably be
developed or licensed by Plaintiffs is use of the songs and poems in the Harry Potter
novels. Because Plaintiffs would reasonably license the musical production or print
publication of those songs and poems, Defendant unfairly harms this derivative market
by reproducing verbatim the songs and poems without a license.”).
146
See STEVE VANDER ARK, THE LEXICON: AN UNAUTHORIZED GUIDE TO HARRY
POTTER FICTION AND RELATED MATERIALS (2009).
144
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equally across the board in all cases of borrowing. The taxonomy
allows us to separate out classes of borrowing that raise
predominantly commercial considerations from those that raise
questions of attribution or social benefit. While all of these
concerns overlap to some extent, the taxonomy demonstrates that
different issues are paramount in different kinds of borrowing
situations.
Starting with the issue of “transformativeness,” it appears that
courts in the copyright context are in fact bifurcating this concept
(in the context of the first fair use factor) into two distinct limbs.147
The first is traditional transformativeness of the defendant’s use of
the plaintiff’s work, which we typically see in the case of a
derivative work.148 This is the type of transformativeness that
involves the defendant adding new insights to the work itself. In
the case of the taxonomy, we typically see this type of
transformativeness in categories (d) and (e) which involve creating
unauthorized prequels, sequels, retellings, etc. of a given work.
Interestingly, in these cases, creators of original works tend mainly
to become concerned about transformativeness in cases where
another person is attempting to commercialize a new version of the
work.149 Once we are in the territory of commercialization, more
pressure is put on the notion of traditional transformativeness (or
transformation of content) under the first fair use factor if the case
is litigated.150 Thus, there appears to be a clear relationship
between commercialization and traditional transformativeness in
the world of unauthorized reworkings of existing original literary
texts.
The second type of transformativeness that has arisen with
respect to literary works is where the transformation refers to the
function to which the work is put, rather than the content of the
work. These are the cases like the Google book-digitization
project where the works are copied verbatim, and the
147

See Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (“Courts have found a transformative
purpose both where the defendant combines copyrighted expression with original
expression to produce a new creative work . . . , and where the defendant uses a
copyrighted work in a different context to serve a different function than the original.”).
148
See id.
149
See id.
150
See id.
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transformation arises in terms of enhanced searchability and easier
access to the work by potential consumers. Like the more
traditional concept of transformativeness, this new concept is
based on a policy of enhancing social benefit, but it operates
differently in that it focuses on function rather than form of the
copies. In cases of transformative functionality, the creator of an
original work may be less concerned about commercial purposes
of the defendant and more concerned about potential market
displacement. Thus, there is perhaps a clear relationship between
transformative functionality and market displacement, regardless
of whether or not the defendant’s purposes revolve around making
a commercial profit.
In other words, maybe notions of
traditional/substantive transformativeness go hand in hand with
concerns about unauthorized commercialization of the new work,
while functional transformativeness is more clearly connected with
market displacement questions.
B. Unauthorized Commercialization
Unauthorized commercial benefit is obviously a key concern of
those involved in any creative endeavor and the publishing
industry is no exception. As we saw in Part II, in the context of
fanfiction, one of the main concerns expressed by readers and
authors is that a fanfiction author should not commercially benefit
from characters and situations created by others if not authorized to
do so. Copyright law also heavily weighs in favor of preventing
unauthorized commercial appropriations of the plaintiff’s work by
the defendant.151 Two of the four fair use factors—factors one and
four—take into account the defendant’s potential commercial
purposes (factor one) and the damage the defendant may have done
or may yet do to the plaintiff’s market (factor four).152 However,
commercial motives on the copyist’s part are less relevant in cases
of transformative functionality, such as the Google book
digitization project, even where an entire work is copied verbatim.
One contribution the taxonomy of borrowing makes is to assist
in unpacking the concept of commercialization for copyright
151

See id. at 545 (on significance of commercial use mitigating against fair use
generally).
152
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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purposes, and perhaps also to give a stronger sense of current
market norms with respect to unauthorized borrowing. Inherent in
the taxonomy is the idea that commercialization is not a “one size
fits all” concept, but contains degrees of seriousness. Commercial
motives on a defendant’s part may be acceptable provided that the
defendant is engaging in activities that are significantly socially
beneficial and do not create market substitutes for the original
works, such as in the case of large-scale digital libraries. This is
the point of the distinction between categories (a) and (b) in the
taxonomy. The traditional commercial piracy cases involving
market displacement of the original work are wrongful while cases
where there is no such displacement are likely to be acceptable
where there is a significant social benefit inherent in the verbatim
copying.
Commercial motives are also regarded as unacceptable (or at
least less acceptable) when the copyist is disseminating a work
derived from the original work without attribution whether or not
the resulting copy is a perfect substitute for the original work. In
cases of “snippet copying” involving unauthorized commercial
remixing of existing works (category (c)), the profit motives of the
copyists appear to be significant to the question whether the
activities should be prohibited.
The snippet copying cases are problematic because they may
be “like” traditional piracy but rather than involving a verbatim
copy of the whole work they are derived from snippets of multiple
works. In other words, they may or may not perfectly substitute
for the original work and are less likely than category (a) cases to
contain appropriate attribution to original authors. High profile
examples of snippet copying cases are Kaavya Viswanathan’s
novel How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life in
the brick-and-mortar publishing world and Jordin Williams
repurposing snippets of Tammara Webber’s and Jamie McGuire’s
best-selling self-published romance titles.153 If not for the
commercialization of these works, there may not have been such
an outcry against them. While the repurposed works would have
involved a lack of attribution to original sources, the lack of
153

See discussion supra Part II.C.
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attribution may not have seemed as egregious or noteworthy if the
copyist had not been attempting to profit from the resulting work.
To the extent that the central concern of these cases is about
unauthorized commercialization, they are similar to the derivative
works cases that involve unauthorized commercial profit—
category (d) in the above taxonomy. While it is possible that
questions of attribution could arise in a derivative works case, in
many derivative works cases, attribution is express or implied from
context. In cases of sequels, prequels, and retellings of an original
story, the identity of the author of the original work will be
obvious from the context. Readers would be less likely to be
attracted to the new work if not for the existence of, and the
readers’ familiarity with, the original.
So, again, as with the category (c) cases, it is the idea of
making an unauthorized profit from another’s work that may be the
key concern in many category (d) cases, rather than a concern with
attribution. In countries with a robust moral rights jurisprudence,
these kinds of situations—both categories (c) and (d)—could also
raise authorial concerns about the right of integrity.
C. Attribution and Plagiarism
There is less to say legally, at least in the context of American
law, about attribution and plagiarism than about transformativeness
and commercialization. This is because moral rights are not a part
of the copyright legislation that applies to literary works,154 and
plagiarism is not a legal wrong. However, it is worth briefly
discussing the relevance of concepts of attribution and plagiarism
in the literary borrowing context because of their importance with
respect to the existence of market norms and practices.
As noted above, allegations of failure to attribute sources and
plagiarism may be more effective market deterrents to unattributed
borrowing than a threat of copyright infringement.155 Kaavya
Viswanathan’s book was quickly recalled, and her publishing deal
and movie option promptly cancelled, following allegations of
154

The protections of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 do not apply to literary
works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(A).
155
See discussion supra Part I.D.
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plagiarism.156 The threat of copyright infringement, on the other
hand, may take a much longer time to resolve itself, as it may rely
on lawyers and litigation rather than on the publisher’s concerns
about its reputation in the marketplace. While publishers will not
be cavalier about a claim of copyright infringement, it does not
raise the same implications about a commercial party’s honor and
reputation than an allegation of plagiarism.
Copyright
infringements are strict-liability wrongs and illegal copying can be
unconscious on the part of an author, while plagiarism contains
unambiguous connotations of disreputable practices.157
The taxonomy illustrates that the situations where concerns
about attribution and plagiarism come to the fore are typically the
category (c) “snippet copying” cases like the Viswanathan novel
and the Jordin Williams e-book.158 These are clear-cut cases in
which a copyist has drawn from the works of others without
attribution, but has typically also done so for her own commercial
benefit—to profit from deceiving the consumer about the true
provenance of the work. As noted in the previous sub-part,
unauthorized commercial benefit seems to be a large part of the
concern about this kind of borrowing. There are few situations
where there has been such an outcry about unattributed borrowing
in cases where the copyist is not attempting to make a commercial
profit.
CONCLUSION
What conclusions might we draw from the above taxonomy of
borrowing in the context of literary works? Hopefully, the
taxonomy, drawn as it is from actual market practices and legal
cases, illustrates the most common current concerns of those
involved in the digital publishing industry. In so doing, it enables
us to tease out the key factors that concern authors, copyright
holders, readers, and others involved with literary texts in the
digital age. Copyright law can be rather a blunt instrument
because of its strict-liability approach to infringing conduct.
156
157
158

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.D.
Id.
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Paradoxically, it can also be somewhat vague in terms of the
application of the flexible fair use doctrine, giving little ex ante
guidance as to what classes of borrowing conduct are acceptable.
Plagiarism, on the other hand, is a matter of honor and reputation
and does not in and of itself give rise to a legal cause of action or
an award of damages by way of compensation to the wronged
party.
The point of the taxonomy is to draw together key threads from
Copyright law and plagiarism (with some reference to moral rights
doctrines in other jurisdictions) to ascertain whether laws, policies,
and practices related to borrowing from literary texts in the digital
age can be better streamlined or at least better understood in the
future. The aim has not been to suggest dramatic law reform for
the publishing sector in particular, or for Copyright law in general.
To the extent that the discussion impacts on future legal
applications, the idea is to guide participants in the industry and
judges applying Copyright law to literary works on the key
considerations that may arise in different situations. In other
words, this Article is intended to focus future thinking on the most
effective ways to apply copyright doctrines, with an emphasis on
fair use factors one and four, to meet the needs of the digital
publishing industry. As conceived in this Article, the publishing
industry includes both traditional publishers and self-published
authors.
A second goal of the discussion has been to help those within
all segments of the industry to better understand acceptable social
and market norms with respect to unauthorized borrowing from
literary texts. Concepts of plagiarism and attribution are more
likely to implicate publishers, authors, and consumers, than judges
and legislators. Yet, they are of importance to those within the
industry, and should not be ignored simply because they do not
give rise to a legal claim.
From the above discussion, it seems that those involved in the
various segments of the industry need to better understand when,
and to what extent, concepts like transformativeness,
commercialization, and attribution—or lack thereof—will be
relevant in a given situation, and the interplay between them. Of
course, the taxonomy is not exhaustive and there may be conduct
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that does not neatly fit into the categories set out above or that may
overlap categories. The taxonomy may require further explication
as literary text borrowing practices continue to evolve online.
It is also important to understand that while copyright laws and
moral imperatives like plagiarism are relevant and may be applied
to various sectors of creative endeavors (art, literature, games,
music, movies, etc.), there are significant benefits to occasionally
engaging in a sector-specific examination of their application.
Each field of creative endeavor involves sector-specific concerns
as well as common concerns. Interestingly, copyright concerns
relating to the digitization and self-publishing of literary works are
relatively new in comparison to those involving other sectors of
creative endeavor. The last few years have seen a rash of court
cases involving the publishing industry, whereas previous decades
showed comparatively little litigation involving the industry as
compared with, say, music and movies.159 In light of this fact, the
time is ripe for a sector-specific examination of the needs of the
digital publishing industry in the hopes of streamlining and
clarifying the commercial and moral imperatives underpinning the
modern industry.

159

See Lipton, supra note 53.

